"Wrong, but useful": negotiating uncertainty in infectious disease modelling. by Christley, RM et al.
‘‘Wrong, but Useful’’: Negotiating Uncertainty in
Infectious Disease Modelling
Robert M. Christley1,2*, Maggie Mort3, Brian Wynne4, Jonathan M. Wastling1, A. Louise Heathwaite5,
Roger Pickup6, Zoe¨ Austin5¤, Sophia M. Latham1,2
1 Institute of Infection and Global Health, University of Liverpool, Neston, Cheshire, United Kingdom, 2National Consortium for Zoonosis Research, Neston, Cheshire,
United Kingdom, 3Department of Sociology and School of Medicine, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom, 4Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of
Genomics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, Lancaster, United Kingdom, 5 Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom, 6 Biomedical
and Life Sciences Division, Lancaster University, Lancaster, United Kingdom
Abstract
For infectious disease dynamical models to inform policy for containment of infectious diseases the models must be able to
predict; however, it is well recognised that such prediction will never be perfect. Nevertheless, the consensus is that
although models are uncertain, some may yet inform effective action. This assumes that the quality of a model can be
ascertained in order to evaluate sufficiently model uncertainties, and to decide whether or not, or in what ways or under
what conditions, the model should be ‘used’. We examined uncertainty in modelling, utilising a range of data: interviews
with scientists, policy-makers and advisors, and analysis of policy documents, scientific publications and reports of major
inquiries into key livestock epidemics. We show that the discourse of uncertainty in infectious disease models is multi-
layered, flexible, contingent, embedded in context and plays a critical role in negotiating model credibility. We argue that
usability and stability of a model is an outcome of the negotiation that occurs within the networks and discourses
surrounding it. This negotiation employs a range of discursive devices that renders uncertainty in infectious disease
modelling a plastic quality that is amenable to ‘interpretive flexibility’. The utility of models in the face of uncertainty is a
function of this flexibility, the negotiation this allows, and the contexts in which model outputs are framed and interpreted
in the decision making process. We contend that rather than being based predominantly on beliefs about quality, the
usefulness and authority of a model may at times be primarily based on its functional status within the broad social and
political environment in which it acts.
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Introduction
Over the last few decades infectious disease dynamical
modelling has attained a central role in contingency planning for
outbreaks of human and livestock diseases and in guiding policy
responses in the face of epidemics [1,2]. Such modelling activities
may be commissioned by governments, or may be developed
independently by researchers. However, in each case a strong
motivation is to guide some form of action to prevent or respond to
a disease event or threat. Some recent examples include modelling
to inform policy decisions for human and animal diseases such as
SARS, H1N1 swine influenza, H5N1 Avian influenza, HIV, foot-
and-mouth disease, classical swine fever and bluetongue.
A key feature of many of these epidemics is that they are
emerging or re-emerging [3,4] and thus have limited or no
precedents within the time and place of interest. Such situations
are simultaneously proposed as being ideally suited to the
application of modelling and problematic for modelling. That is,
whilst modelling may be proposed to provide clarity in complex
and rapidly emerging situations [5], there is often no ‘‘off the
shelf’’ model available, the system may be poorly defined and
understood, input data may be limited, there is likely to be limited
replicate data for validation and there may be unrealistic pressure
for rapid results.
Key to the role of models in informing policy for containment of
specific diseases is the requirement for the model to be able to
predict [6] although it is well recognised that such prediction can
never be perfect [7]. That is, models should not aim for ‘certain
knowledge’ but rather should provide adequate ‘approximations’
of a real world. The lacunae that prevent the model approxima-
tions from attaining certainty include a wide range of factors that
we refer to as uncertainties. A range of classifications of uncertainty
has emerged in the natural and social sciences [8]. A key
distinction can be made between weak uncertainties (also known as
‘probabilistic’ uncertainties, ‘statistical’ uncertainties or ‘risks’) that
can be expressed in probabilistic terms, and strong uncertainties (also
called ‘scenario’ uncertainties or just ‘uncertainty’) where a range
of possible outcomes may be known (or may remain unknown in
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the case of ignorance), but where probabilities cannot be ascribed to
these. An example of weak uncertainty could include the
estimation of the probability of transmission of an infectious agent
from an infectious individual to a susceptible individual given a
particular form of contact between them. This probability is
bounded by 0 and 1, but its precise value, or even the most likely
range of values, remains uncertain. An example of strong
uncertainty could include questions relating to the systems
involved, for example: ‘how should the systems be conceptualised
in a model?’ and ‘what, and whose, priorities should dictate the
goals of interventions, and how are the effects of such interventions
best assessed?’ A further key distinction can be made between
reducible (or epistemic) uncertainty and irreducible (ontological)
uncertainty [9]. Some of the former represent a failure of practice
(or, at least, a limitation) which can be resolved through, for
example, improved measurement or further research, but other
elements may reflect what has been defined as the essential finitism
of scientific knowledge [10]. The latter reflects a fundamental
inability to know some things and results in outcomes that defy
prediction because causal chains and networks are open or
contingent [8].
In this paper, we agree with Wynne [11] that there ‘‘is no fixed
level of uncertainty ‘out there’, but different interacting percep-
tions of how much, and of what shape and meaning it has’’.
Uncertainty is well recognised in modelling practice and its
influence is expressed in the well-known mantra: ‘‘All models are
wrong, but some are useful’’ [12]. For example, forms of this
saying can be found in infectious disease modelling textbooks (for
example [7]) and in statements by policy makers (quoted in [13]).
Whilst this notion of being wrong but useful recognises the
uncertainty inherent in modelling, it also assumes the uncertainties
in individual models can be sufficiently stabilised to permit use of
the model predictions for valid decision-making. The consensus
appears to be that although models are uncertain, some may yet
inform action. An implicit qualification may be suggested here –
that with such qualities, models may inform effective action, so
long as they are interpreted and used appropriately. Such
statements assume what sociologists of science policy describe as
a reflexive capability on the part of modellers and their policy users
– that the quality of a model be ascertained in order to decide
whether or not, or in what ways or under what conditions, it
should be ‘used’. However, model uncertainties are not calculable
– there are no units of uncertainty. Only some particular uncertainties
can be quantified, and even these may be uncertain.
We argue that the utility of a model is negotiated in practice
within the networks and discourses surrounding it. So that while
the common view is that ‘‘Simulation models are virtual worlds
which aim to mimic the real world…’’ even if ‘‘…by necessity they
are approximations of the real world’’ [14], a model can never be
a faithful reflection of nature or of a human-nature system. A
model is produced by individuals who must make a multitude of
decisions during its creation and who bring a range of
assumptions, social and natural, to defining the system of interest,
and to defining the actors and their relationships, which compose
it. Hence, a model is not simply the in silico representation of a
system, free from human influence, but rather is socially produced
within the discourses of its representation. Discourse here
encompasses text and spoken word as well as algebraic,
diagrammatic and other representations of models, including
tables, figures and images depicting results. This discourse occurs
in informal conversation, formal presentation, and in all commu-
nication with colleagues, policy makers and lay communities,
without which the model would not exist in any meaningful way
and could not be socially active as a tool.
The aim of this paper was to explore how models come to be
stabilised in the face of multiple uncertainties. In doing so we show
that modelling discourse is multi-layered, flexible, contingent,
embedded in context and plays a critical role in negotiating
credibility. Here, negotiation is a process that operates in three
senses: the modeller tries to navigate a way through a set of
articulated uncertainties; to convey the efficacy of the methods used
to mitigate these uncertainties; and, in doing so, agree with others a
co-produced understanding of the level of uncertainty present in
the model. We contend that negotiation enables production of a
more coherent model by both addressing and obscuring uncer-
tainties. It is, we argue, through this that models are able to be
presented as valid and coherent visions of ‘reality’ and hence gain
authority to guide action. This is a necessary practice in order to
invest models with sufficient authority that they can act within the
decision making process; it is the means by which some models
may be judged useful, and others not.
Our interdisciplinary analysis examines methods through which
model uncertainty may be negotiated, beginning with what it is
that models should do in terms of prediction. Subsequently we
dissect the technical practices of model definition, design and
testing respectively, in order to illustrate the flexibility with which
issues of uncertainty are negotiated in infectious disease model
production. Finally, we attend to the interaction between
modelling and policy-making and explore the role of negotiation
in this process.
Methods
Ethical statement
This study was approved by the Lancaster University Research
Ethics Committee. Participants were provided with information
describing the project several days prior to the interview and the
purpose of the project was further discussed before each interview
commenced. Participants were informed that their interview
transcripts would be anonymised, kept securely and that any
material potentially leading to identification would be removed.
Consent forms, signed by all participants, specified that they could
terminate the interviews, or withdraw from the study, at any time
without providing a reason.
Study design
The analysis presented in this paper draws on a 3-year
interdisciplinary research programme addressing the social,
technological and natural dynamics of animal disease manage-
ment across a range of policy scales (http://www.
relulostintranslation.co.uk/). The project team comprised veteri-
nary scientists and epidemiologists, sociologists, microbiologists
and environmental scientists. We utilised a range of primary and
secondary data including 24 interviews with scientists (including
mathematical modellers, infectious disease biologists, public health
and veterinary scientists), policy-makers, advisors and other users
of model results, as well as analysis of policy documentation,
scientific publications, textbooks and reports of inquiries into key
animal epidemics. Interviews were conducted in person, lasting
between (approximately) 30 and 150 minutes. Interviews were
semi-structured and included open-ended questions to elicit
discussion around complex topics and areas of interest. Because
this research investigated a range of issues related to disease
containment and management, participants were necessarily
drawn from a wide range of backgrounds. Hence, while some
interviews focused on issues directly related to dynamical infectious
disease modelling, others only briefly addressed this topic. Policy
documents, scientific publications and reports of inquiries were
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identified using a combination of Internet search engines (Google
and Google Scholar), online databases (Pubmed, Web of
Knowledge and Scopus), citations in identified key publications
and by recommendation from study participants and the project’s
multi-agency steering group.
Analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The
transcripts and other documents drawn on were subjected to
multiple readings and analysed using an open coding method by
the first author. This entailed line-by-line coding, examining the
content, structure and the explicit and implicit meanings within
the text. Basic analytical codes were developed from this fine level
of data analysis, which involved both inductive (arising from the
content of the text) and deductive (questioning the implicit points
within the narrative) approaches. As the analysis continued further
routes of enquiry emerged from the data itself and from theory
derived in similar studies from within the field of Science and
Technology Studies (STS, see below). Results were discussed in
detail among the first three authors and at in-depth cross-
disciplinary meetings with all authors.
Although not a specific intention at the outset, the insights in
this paper predominantly relate to models of foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD), particularly to those relevant to the UK 2001 FMD
outbreak, in which modelling had a central and controversial role.
Theory underpinning the analysis
In our analysis, we draw on insights from the field of STS and in
particular on three key studies of scientific discourse: Gilbert and
Mulkay [15], Pinch et al [16] and Singleton [17]. Gilbert and
Mulkay [15] draw upon interviews and observations with
biochemists, exposing distinctive forms of scientific accounting
(the empiricist and the contingent repertoires) and their selective use in
discursive exchanges between competing schools of thought. They
found that formal scientific research literature is dominated by the
empiricist repertoire in which data are given priority over the
actions of the author. In contrast, the contingent repertoire is more
informal and idiosyncratic, and insights are revealed as being
dependent on speculative understandings, prior intellectual
commitments, personal characteristics, tacit skills, social ties and
group membership.
Pinch et al [16] analyse discourse surrounding the proposed,
and controversial, introduction of clinical budgeting in the UK
National Health Service in the mid 1980s. They identify two
rhetorical patterns that, in part, parallel the empiricist and
contingent repertoires of Gilbert and Mulkay [15] but which
ascribe greater function to forms of discourse. The strong program
(‘‘hard sell’’) draws on an empiricist repertoire, in which health
economics is treated as a rational calculator demanding radical
change. In contrast, the weak program (‘‘soft sell’’) draws on a
more contingent repertoire, in which the controversial methodol-
ogy is presented as user friendly, helpful to practitioners and not
involving radical changes. Pinch et al [16] also explore discourse
around the testing of new technology to reveal the role of these
rhetorical patterns in production of successful test outcomes.
Singleton’s study [17] of the discourse of laboratory workers in
the UK national cervical screening program identifies both a
‘‘triumphant discourse about the successful introduction and
expansion’’ of the screening program that prevents the progression
of cervical cancer and saves lives and ‘‘reference to continued
mortality and persistent failure…which constructs [screening] as
problematic and ineffective’’. Hence, screening is characterised by
‘‘instability’’ and ‘‘multiple identities’’, yet rather than undermin-
ing the program, or the role of the laboratory, Singleton illustrates
how this instability and multiplicity contributes to the continuity of
the program and strengthens claims regarding the role of the
laboratory in the program.
Results and Discussion
Models and prediction
In this paper we are particularly interested in those models that
are used for prediction where issues of uncertainty are central to
claims about the utility of model results. Many models of foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) in the UK have clear claims of a predictive
role, and/or are interpreted to have such a role; for example such
claims occur in in the reports of the major inquiries into the 2001
epidemic [18–20]; and in scientific papers describing models (e.g.
[21–25]).
There is, however, evidence of confusion regarding the role of
models in prediction, and in what is thought reasonable to expect
of their predictive ability. At one level there is open recognition
that models cannot accurately and explicitly reconstruct actual
epidemic events:
E1 (Report)
Despite the advances in modelling that will arise in the
coming decades, models will never be able to accurately
predict if, or when, a particular person, farm or community
will become infected. This is for two reasons: (i) the
transmission of infection is a stochastic process, such that
no two epidemics are identical; (ii) models will always be an
approximation, and rare or unforeseen behavioural events
can have a significant impact on the disease dynamics [italics
in original] [26].
Here, two contingent effects are highlighted. The first recognises
the indeterminacy of the system being modelled (at least at the
level of the individual person, farm or group); the second highlights
the uncertainty (perhaps ignorance) present in the system
contextualisation, model composition and parameterisation and
an inability to plan for surprise events. This mirrors the distinction
noted earlier between ontological (real system) and epistemic
(knowledge of it) uncertainty.
However, the apparent determinacy of the modelled system
may be emphasised, and this may minimise the impact of
irreducible uncertainties. In part, this may reflect a belief that
models are able (at least to some extent) to overcome such
indeterminacy and find the world to be more deterministic at some
notional deeper level:
E2 (Scientific paper)
Our confidence in the model goodness of fit is reinforced by
the extent to which the simulation model parameterised
using the inference model parameter estimates was able not
just to reproduce the pattern of the 2001 outbreak, but in
many cases predict exactly which farms would become
infected. …While the timing of the infection of individual
farms can be much less well predicted, the level of
‘determinism’ in the epidemic process our analysis has
revealed may make detailed real-time prediction more
feasible. Indeed, given real-time prediction conditions on the
current state of an epidemic rather than the state at some
early selected time point, one might expect to do rather
better than the degree of correspondence seen here between
observations and data, especially later in the epidemic. [27].
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This account adopts a more empiricist repertoire than that of
E1 and implies that the epidemics are, in key ways, deterministic at
the individual (farm) level. It thus implies that the key cause of the
apparent indeterminacy is a failure adequately to measure
necessary parameters.
The above extract (E2) from a scientific paper describing a
particular model contrasts markedly with the following extract
from the final report of a group set up to review Defra’s use of
modelling, completed the following year. Of key interest is that
one of the authors of this report was also an author of the
previously quoted paper:
E3 (Report)
…models of livestock disease dynamics may include every
farm in the UK, but model output at the farm-level has such
high levels of uncertainty that the results at that scale are of
limited utility, meaning aggregated output is usually used.
[28].
Part of this apparent inconsistency lies in the inevitable
ambiguity in expectations of future model improvement, and the
confusion sometimes observed between expected model perfor-
mance, and promised or aspired-to future performance (e.g. [29]),
and actual current performance. Examination of these extracts
(E1, E2 and E3) highlights variable interpretation of the potential
for models to predict. This variation emerges through the
differential application of elements of the empiricist and contin-
gent repertoires. Of note is the different intended audience and
purpose of the extract documents: a textbook for modellers
describing the science of modelling (E1); a scientific paper
providing evidence to support application of a new method in
epidemic situations (E2); and an internal report to a government
department scrutinizing issues surrounding use of models in
policy-making (E3).
Emphasis on the determinacy of a model may ultimately lead to
expression of model results as predictive truths [30]. For example,
the following statement, relating to the models used in the 2001
FMD epidemic, suggests the model output provides an exact guide
as to the events that will occur under a range of scenarios, with no
allowance for any form of uncertainty:
E4 (Parliamentary Inquiry)
And, of course, what it stresses is the importance of the
scientific modelling that was done to project forward from
any point during the outbreak as to what the outcome would be
given various control scenarios. [italics added] UK Chief
Scientific Advisor, Prof David King, quoted from [31].
King’s statement, made to the UK Parliamentary Inquiry into
the impact of the 2001 FMD epidemic, illustrates the use of strong
program rhetoric (hard sell [16]). Here, modelling science
unequivocally indicates the different futures open to decision
makers; no accommodation is made for contingency, nor thus for
alternative scientific views. This contrasts with the weak program
rhetoric (soft sell) adopted in a scientific journal paper read
predominantly by microbiologists:
E5 (Scientific paper)
The model [i.e. as referred to by King, above] can be used to
explore the expected impact of alternative control strategies.
[emphasis added] [32].
This soft sell presents modelling as an exploratory tool to assess
what might be of the impact of alternative choices, implying that
modelling provides a starting point for discussion and need not
dogmatically warrant a specific action in response.
Production of models
A range of technical practices form the overt tools through
which a model is formulated, implemented and tested, broadly
those that define and design the model, and those used to test or
validate the model. To explore discourses of definition and design
we draw on three activities: selection of input data, parameterisa-
tion and enumeration of uncertainties. In the next section we
explore the discourse of model testing.
Some models of the UK 2001 FMD epidemic utilised input data
of almost unprecedented detail. For example databases, developed
for a range of purposes, contained information on farms, including
their location and the species of livestock present on these farms.
As farms have fixed locations (although this is contested as, for
example, some farms exist as multiple, disconnected geographic
locations yet would appear as a single location in a database [33])
and the spatial pattern of the epidemic was used to infer the
predominance of short-range transmission, incorporation in
models of location data was seen by many as important. However,
accounts of the quality of these data vary widely.
E6 (Scientific paper)
The epidemic has generated a unique data set describing the
spatial spread of an infectious disease between fixed nodes,
i.e., livestock farms. This, together with the availability of
data on the location and livestock composition for all UK
farms [collected by the Department of the Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)], offers an unusual
opportunity to explore the impact of spatial and individual
heterogeneities on the course of an epidemic and the
importance of these variables for the design of appropriate
disease control programs [22].
E7 (Interview – modeller)
Yes, but you know, the people who curate the database of
farms really don’t care where they are. You know, why
they’ve got that information in they probably don’t know.
They’ve got an address of the person they write to, that’s the
only real spatial location they need and the fact that the
geographical co-ordinates place the farm in the middle of
the North Sea you know, so what. And they probably work
on a 5% acceptable accuracy you know, error rate anyway
or some kind of error rate and they’re not going to spend a
huge amount of resource to make sure that the x, y co-
ordinates are actually spot on.
The description of the data presented in the scientific paper (E6)
is short and impersonal; it gives logical precedence to the existing
data which, by implication, represent the relevant aspects of the
natural world. In contrast the interview (E7) gives a more informal
account of the role of individuals, organisational culture and
resources in the production of the data and their effects on data
quality. We see a stark contrast between the empiricist and
contingent repertoires, respectively, and of the effect of these
discourses on the production of an account of the uncertainty
present in these data, and in the model.
Singleton [17] describes the functional role that instability can
have in stabilising a technology. Extract E7 (above) highlights
uncertainties in essential data, which may be interpreted as
Uncertainty in Infectious Disease Modelling
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undermining, to an unknown extent, results derived from models
using such data. However, as the view from a different modeller
below indicates, this same instability (data uncertainty) is
emblematic of the benefits of modelling.
E8 (Interview – modeller)
[Where] modelling, in its broader sense, is becoming more
capable of making a difference is in what’s, kind of, generally
called data synthesis or taking data from a noisy and
incomplete data from a wide variety of sources and pulling it
together to make something which is a little bit more than
the sum of its parts.
Here, the very issue that seems to undermine models in E7 is
seen in E8 as strengthening their role, which is represented as
being able to accommodate uncertainty and ambiguity, by
synthesising disparate data from disparate contexts.
Parameters are numerical characteristics that, as a set, define
the behaviour of a model. For example, relatively simple models
may be defined with just a few parameters defining the ‘birth’ and
‘death’ rates, the duration of infectiousness and the rate at which
infectious individuals transmit infection to susceptible individuals.
Estimation of these parameters (an activity referred to as
parameterisation) may take a range of forms. Pre-existing information
may be used, particularly for those parameters believed to be
observable. For example, information obtained from study of
infected individuals may be used to infer some values, such as the
duration of infectiousness. Other parameters are not observable
and hence must be estimated in some way. In the 2001 UK FMD
epidemic key parameters to be estimated included those that
determined the transmission of infection from infected to
uninfected farms.
E9 (scientific paper)
A key modeling decision is how to represent the local and
regional spatial clustering of FMD cases (Fig. 1A), which
precludes the use of standard models based on homoge-
neously mixed host populations (1). This contagion is
quantified by the spatial infection kernel of the disease (2)
(Fig. 1B); after the introduction of movement restrictions in
late February, the kernel shows a high probability of local
spread, with a tail of less frequent longer range ‘‘sparks’’ of
infection. Some of the local effects caused by the clustering
of infection can be modeled implicitly, with deterministic
approximations (3, 4). However, to explore the full
spatiotemporal dynamics of the epidemic–in particular, the
highly irregular behavior in the epidemic tail–we use a
stochastic, spatial, individual farm–based model. The
stochastic nature of transmission generates inherent uncer-
tainty in the ability to predict events; however, in this
epidemic, there are also two more systematic sources of
uncertainty. First, we only have a qualitative grasp of the
multifaceted nature of FMD transmission between farms (5–
8); key transmission parameters must therefore be derived by
fitting the model to the epidemic data. Second, there are
biases and various lacunae in the epidemiological and
management data used to construct the model (9). We
summarize how these uncertainties affect our predictions in
the supplementary material (10)…
…Because of the rapid transmission of the virus between
livestock in the same farm, it is reasonable to treat the farm
as the individual unit (4, 11–13), classifying each holding as
either susceptible, incubating, infectious, or slaughtered. We
also incorporate the heterogeneity in farm size and species
composition (13) by allowing the susceptibility and infec-
tiousness of farms to vary with the type and number of
livestock (14). In principle, the necessary parameters can be
estimated from the observed pattern of cases by maximum
likelihood. However, we cannot rely only on this, because of
spatial and temporal biases in the data (9). We therefore
adopt a two-stage approach, generating an initial fit by
maximum likelihood, then refining it by least squares fits to
regional epidemics (10) [22].
E10 (Interview – modeller)
In terms of the actual pathogen itself, yes, the amount of
data actually, which was useful to modelling, on the
transmission characteristics of the disease, even the natural
history of the disease within infected animals, was rather
limited. I mean, effectively most of the – well it’s data or
knowledge out there was qualitative rather than quantitative
and so, I mean, what we tended to find was that a relatively
small group of scientists worldwide had been working on
foot and mouth. They were the experts called upon
historically to advise and control of the epidemic and they,
sort of, had a, kind of, gut feeling of this is how it behaved
and a lot of it wasn’t really quantified in any, sort of,
rigorous way.
[...]
I mean, one could piece together reasonable estimates, but a
lot of things weren’t available. That has changed to some
degree, so there has been a recognition since that point in
time that some of the things which were being focused on
perhaps were less relevant and other things were being
focused on more in terms of – particularly some of the
transmission studies undertaken, but also some of the basic
virology.
Interviewer: So how did you cope with that when you were trying to
present results…?
I mean, eventually you present a set of assumptions. I mean,
to that sort of group, it depends on the context, but
effectively you present a set of assumptions about things like
incubation periods relationship between infectiousness and
level of symptoms, how long it takes symptoms to clear,
those sort of things to a, kind of, expert group and they
comment on whether they think they’re reasonable.
A feature, clearly evident in the first part of scientific paper E9,
is the repeated posing and resolution of problems, a practice
referred to as deproblematisation by Singleton (1998). We see that
standard models with homogeneous mixing are precluded, so a
spatial infection kernel is introduced; the stochastic nature of
transmission can be incorporated using a stochastic model;
derivation of transmission parameters using data avoids problems
due to limited existing information. Although the extract opens
with a statement highlighting that a decision must be made, the
authors are merely impartial actors in this decision-making
process, taking actions as required in a purely technical fashion.
The use of an empiricist repertoire here is obvious. For example,
in the second sentence, the ‘‘contagion is quantified by the spatial
infection kernel of the disease’’ [our emphasis]: there is no sense that
this kernel is being estimated in a fashion that requires the
Uncertainty in Infectious Disease Modelling
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judgement of individuals; the authors are working with the kernel,
rather than one of a number of possible variants, and; this is the
kernel of this disease –a property of the disease, not a product of
scientific activity. Furthermore, where there is recognition of the
contingent nature of knowledge about FMD there is an empiricist
solution which ‘‘must’’ (and, presumably, can) be undertaken
‘‘fitting the model to the epidemic data’’. The existence of biases
and lacunae is mentioned, but further information regarding these
is relegated to the supplementary material. Access to this
information requires reference to endnotes and, from there to
online documentation (further discussed below.) This extract
emphasises the power of modelling to deal with what may
otherwise be substantial problems in interpretation of the outbreak
data.
In contrast, in interview E10 we observe a strongly contingent
repertoire where a very different process is outlined, one highly
subject to a wide range of influences. Both scientific paper E9 and
interview E10 are concerned with what is basically the same
parameterisation process, but they are from different sources and
each is describing the actions of different groups of people. Hence,
some of the differences are likely to arise due to the different events
being described. Nevertheless, each takes a very different
perspective – one largely technical and deterministic, the other
presents a process that is informal, intuitive and contingent.
Figure 1. Graphical representation of predictions, made by Imperial College’s modelling team, of the UK 2001 foot-and-mouth
disease epidemic based on data up to 29 March 2001, and comparison with the subsequent epidemic data. Published with permission
Imperial College, London, and the National Audit Office. This figure originally appeared in National Audit Office Report ‘The 2001 outbreak of foot and
mouth disease’ [18].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076277.g001
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Similar issues to those voiced by modellers in interviews E7 and
E10 are used by critics of modelling to refute the ability of models
(or a particular model) to inform action.
E11 (Review paper)
The 2001 predictive models were constructed in an
environment of poor-quality data (e.g. they used out-of-date
census data for stock levels), and poor epidemiological
knowledge (e.g. the transmission characteristics of the virus
strain, and the distribution of the initially infected farms,
were unknown). Therefore, their use as predictive tools was
inappropriate [34].
However, note that in this review the empiricist repertoire is
reinstated in the assertion of the primacy of data, and is juxtaposed
with a more contingent repertoire when the role of modellers as
actors in the modelling process is highlighted in their decision to
use ‘‘out-of-date’’ data. This combination of contingent and
empiricist repertoire creates a dissonance that has the effect of
undermining modelling as an empiricist activity. Here we see that
what was stated to be ‘‘data on the location and livestock
composition for all UK farms [collected by the Department of the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)]’’ (Scientific paper
E6) becomes ‘‘poor-quality data’’ and ‘‘out-of-date census data for
stock levels’’, whilst ‘‘a unique data set describing the spatial
spread of an infectious disease between fixed nodes, i.e., livestock
farms’’ (scientific paper E6) and transmission ‘‘quantified by the
spatial infection kernel of the disease’’ (scientific paper E9)
become, simply, unknown. In fact, the reference to farm location
and composition data made in the main text of scientific paper E6
is expanded in the online supplementary material (E12) to reveal
that these data are indeed sufficiently incorrect to undermine some
aspects of the model’s validity. (However, note that each issue
raised is immediately deproblematised).
E12 (Scientific paper)
The presence of biases in the livestock data is well accepted,
and probably leads to a significant over-estimate of the
number of sheep in Wales at the start of the epidemic and
smaller variation in other areas. This effects [sic] our ability
to model the exact spatial distribution of cases, which may
explain why we slightly overestimate the number of cases in
Wales and Yorkshire. Such a bias will also alter the
proportion of mixed and single-species farms recorded in
the database, although not sufficient to change our
quantitative conclusions. Some of this bias will be absorbed
into the parameters by the fitting procedure. (Online
supplementary material to [22]).
These variable interpretations of information used in models
reflect the battle between those supporting and those refuting their
legitimacy as predictors of the effect of, for example, interventions.
Comparison of these texts emphasises the contested nature of the
calculus of uncertainty and that utilising the ‘all models are wrong,
but some are useful’ mantra to endorse the use of models is
problematic.
The proliferation of potential sources of uncertainty that arise as
models move from a conceptualised to a contextualised system and
thence to a structured model, makes enumeration of all of these
uncertainties an impossibility, let alone full consideration of all
their implications for the veracity of the model conclusions. Hence,
worthwhile recommendations such as: ‘‘In a case when an
assumption simplifies or approximates the underlying epidemiol-
ogy, it should be clearly stated why this assumption has been made
and how this may influence the results’’ [14] can, at best, be only
partially fulfilled and many potential uncertainties must remain
unstated and perhaps unconsidered. This effect may be accentu-
ated within the empiricist repertoire because technical efforts and
subsequent discussion tend to focus only on reducible uncertain-
ties, for example highlighting the need for more precise
measurement.
As mentioned above, Keeling et al [22] enumerate selected
uncertainties present in their model, very much in keeping with
recommendations for best practice [14]. It is noteworthy that,
although briefly mentioned in the main text, this list is found only
in the accompanying online supplementary material, potentially
inhibiting its accessibility. In all, seven kinds of uncertainty are
listed, although each could be viewed as a composite of many
underlying uncertainties. Here we present only the first of these.
E13 (Scientific paper)
Relative infectivity and susceptibility of sheep and cattle. Experimen-
tal results agree with the pattern of species differences used
within the model. Quantitative changes to the species
parameters will modify the predicted spatio-temporal
distribution of outbreaks; our parameters have been chosen
to give the best match to the location of high risk areas.
However this choice of parameters is contingent on the
accuracy of the census distribution of animals on farms [22].
This uncertainty actually encompasses at least four underlying
uncertainties (about each species and each process), but could also
include uncertainties about potential variation in each process (for
example relating to age, breed and other factors that, although
poorly described, may influence individual animals’ immune
systems). Hence, this single listed uncertainty embodies a wide
range of independent potential sources of uncertainty, although
most are not mentioned or discussed. As is well understood, but
may need repeating here, these are not only additive in their
potential cumulative error-magnitudes, but may be multiplicative.
Hence, authors must decide what to present, what to leave out,
what to prioritise and, ultimately, what is to be achieved through
the communication processes in which the model becomes an
actor. The representation of uncertainties through the production
of the model is, therefore, contingent on the actions of the authors,
and alternative choices and representations are possible. Impor-
tantly, omission of any specific uncertainty in communication of
model results may prevent or limit its consideration by consumers/
users of the model results. We contend that selective omission,
reinforced by an empiricist repertoire, is a recurrent feature of
formal modelling discourse, and that this asymmetric accounting
results in understatement of the potential implications of
uncertainties in what are usually mixed biological and social
systems, even when these are recognised by modellers in less
formal discourse.
Testing models
Testing is a vital part of the production of a model. Although
often referred to as a distinct activity (as we do here), which
chronologically follows construction of the model, in practice these
activities are often closely iterative, with early forms of a model
undergoing revision based on testing until a final version is
accepted. Hence, more complex models may be created incre-
mentally by adding detail to simpler models, which are tested at
each stage.
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While technical testing methods represent a key part of the
modeller’s armoury, the lack of consistent interpretation of
necessary standards and procedures for verification, validation
and parameterisation is recognised [28] and this introduces new
uncertainties regarding the veracity and legitimacy – thus also the
public policy authority – of the conclusions based on these
approaches. The practice of testing may include activities defined
as model verification and validation, sensitivity analysis and
scenario analysis. Here we focus on validation.
Model validation has multiple definitions. It has variously been
described as the ‘‘process of ensuring the model is an adequate
representation of the physical or biological system being repre-
sented’’ [28]; or more loosely as ensuring ‘‘that a model is
acceptable for its intended use because it meets specified
performance requirements’’ [14]; or, more restrictively, as
‘‘checking the model outputs against independent data sets’’
[35], and more definitions exist. Of note in these definitions is the
use of qualities such as ‘‘adequate’’ and ‘‘acceptable’’, which must
be subjectively applied. Even apparently purely scientific norms
such as ‘‘specified performance requirements’’ can only be defined
relative to what are social definitions of appropriate uses of such
models.
Woolhouse et al [14] define three kinds of model validation. The
first is the restrictive definition used above, that of comparison
against independent data. The second involves recreation by the
model of the key features of the input data, whilst the third
involves comparison with outputs of other models. We draw on
our data to consider each of these approaches in more detail.
Comparison against independent data. It is well recog-
nised that in the case of many infectious diseases, particularly
epidemics, comparison with independent data is frequently not
achievable, due to lack of additional, comparable events [14,28].
However, early in the 2001 FMD epidemic, models were used to
make predictions of its future course, and these predictions were
compared with subsequent observation. Illustrations of these
predictions, such as those in Figure 1 (reproduced from [18])
appear very impressive. The models suggested the benefits of
introduction of more extensive culling to include farms neigh-
bouring infected farms, and to do this quickly (i.e. within 24 hours
of diagnosis on infected farms and within 48 hours of that
diagnosis on neighbouring farms: the so called 24/48 rule, or
‘contiguous cull’).
The following extract from the UK Parliamentary enquiry [31]
refers to a figure similar to Figure 1.
E14 (Parliamentary enquiry)
Professor King: It was not just a computer model, these
models were learning from the way this outbreak happened.
Please do not say it is just a computer model. It was picking
up on incubation periods, and so on, from the early stages of
this outbreak. Without that, we would have been modelling
any sort of outbreak; it was this outbreak that was being
modelled. And when we give these figures, like 17 per cent
of contiguous farms and the argument for the contiguous
cull, it is all based on this outbreak, and when it was out of
control we were saying, ‘‘This is how you will bring it under
control.’’ And what I would like you to do is to look at the
very impressive figures; if you compare Figure [1], which is
the predictions that were made, the curves A, B, C, with [the
epidemic data – blue dots], which is how the epidemic
developed, I think you have got to agree that that was not
bad agreement, the prediction was not too bad.
The line C in the figure, which was generated from a model
based on the epidemic data represented by the grey dots, does
indeed appear to follow closely the pattern of the subsequent
outbreak (represented by the blue dots). King (then the UK
Government Chief Scientific Adviser) adopts an empiricist
repertoire and strong program rhetoric to sell the authority of
the model in decision-making. Data are given priority in the
production of the model, which ensures that these are not the
results of just any model, but rather are obtained from a very
specific model that encapsulated the important features of the real
outbreak. There is a clear implication that the model results
objectively enforce a particular course of action (represented by
line C) and that the data observed subsequent to the adoption of
this action validate the model, this view being repeated elsewhere
(e.g. [32]). However, alternate readings of the data underpinning
the figure are available.
E15 (Review paper)
What caused the 2001 epidemic to end? This is likely to
have varied between regions. Reducing the period of time
before an animal is slaughtered and increasing detection
rates no doubt contributed to the decline of the epidemic,
and the revised policy measures were designed to facilitate
this. However, reconstructions of the epidemic indicate that
the rate at which new infections were arising peaked
between 19 March and 21 March, and the number of
reported cases peaked on 26 March – before these new
policy measures were implemented. Therefore, the switch to
more stringent control procedures could not have been
responsible for this initial reduction.
…
Given uncertainties in the data and the reliance of these
models on assumptions that are necessarily crude and also
difficult to verify, it is difficult to make the argument that
mathematical models showed that implementation of wide-
spread and intensive culling was the only tenable option.
Models did show clearly, and at a relatively early stage, that a
traditional policy, as previously implemented, was not
sufficient to prevent the development of a very large epidemic.
However, the main arguments in favour of a CP [contiguous
premises] cull are simpler decision-making and ease of
management, together with the benefit that, in a time of
great chaos and uncertainty, a clearly defined policy with
simple goals can be of both logistical and political value. [36].
The potential that the reduction in cases occurred prior to
changes in policy raises doubts regarding claims made for the link
between model-predictions and the observed data. In this passage,
multiple contingent details are revealed. Firstly, the data are
reconfigured as uncertain and the model assumptions as crude.
Interpretation of the model results is then revealed to be a subject
for argument rather than a self-evident empirical phenomenon.
The authors also undermine assertions implicit in the previous
quote from King that the control options recommended were a
biological imperative, but rather suggest that much of the benefit
of the control measures adopted was politically and managerially
derived. Hence, even the more rigorous form of validation, where
a model is tested against independent data, can be contested and
result in flexible interpretation.
Comparison of model output with input data. In practice,
such independent data is rarely available and observed epidemic
data may need to be used for both model development and for
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comparison with model output as part of the process of validation
(the second form of validation noted above). However, this method
is seen as not providing true validation [14]. During model
production input data can be used to guide the model structure
and to estimate the model parameters, and input data may even be
altered in order that model output reflect the observed events. For
example, input data for UK FMD models have been adjusted in
order to achieve good fit with the observed data [37]. This
adjustment, sometimes called ‘parameter-tuning’, is not a trivial
process and it may be expected that it would impact the way the
model represents knowledge of the underlying system. Some
models ‘tuned’ regionally varying parameters in order to ensure
the average simulation results match the observed data [38], whilst
others modified the input demographics (by reducing the sheep
density in particular regions) [22,39].
The expectation that model output should recreate key features
of observed events highlights two additional important points.
First, the assumption that a good fit between model output and
observed events is evidence of a good model, requires reasoning
that cannot be used to demonstrate the validity of a model. There
may be many models which provide a good fit to the observed
data; in which case the model in question is just one of these.
Further, the body of models that satisfy the observed data may
provide very different predictions when confronted with new initial
data or new modifications to reflect different interventions [40].
Secondly, it is worth reconsidering the supposition that an
appropriate model should generate results that match the observed
events. This belief assumes that any observed epidemic event is
very similar to the average of all potential realisations of this event
in the underlying (stochastic) system. However, the average is a
special case, and in the majority of instances the observed event
may be expected to differ from the average by an unknown
amount. For example, modelling of the UK 2001 FMD epidemic
typically assumes that the observed epidemic was the average
epidemic that could have been expected [21,22,37], despite being
one of the two largest epidemics of FMD ever recorded in the UK
[41]. When an observed epidemic is different to the average of
many (hypothetical) occurrences of an epidemic with the same
dynamic properties in an identical system, model-parameters
estimated from the observed epidemic data will differ from their
‘true’ values. This effect was likely the cause of the failure to
predict accurately numerous parameters in a study using data
from a single simulation of an outbreak of avian influenza, though
this was not stated as a probable cause by the authors [42].
Further, if, as Jewell et al (2009) state, key parameters are peculiar
to individual outbreaks, modellers of these events will always be
confronted with a single (perhaps partially observed) epidemic
from which to estimate parameter values or distributions, yet will
be uncertain as to whether the observed epidemic is typical or
large or small for the true underlying parameter set. Although
parameters calculated in this way (from observed outbreak data)
may enable the model results to fit the observed data ‘well’,
assessment of the effect of control strategies may clearly be
misleading if their impact is modelled through modification of mis-
specified parameters.
Despite these concerns, comparison of observed epidemic data
with model output is used to assess the validity of models, and this
is often mistakenly treated as an unproblematic process.
E16 (Scientific paper)
There is very good overall agreement between the average
of the model replicates and the reported cases (Fig. 1). The
observed qualitative pattern of variability is also captured by
the simulations–note, though, that we do not include day-to-
day environmental stochasticity in the model. The average
of our simulations slightly underestimates the epidemic, after
the decline in early April. The first part of this is probably
due to over reporting of cases (10). We may also slightly
underestimate the latter stages of the epidemic, probably
because of small systematic secular changes in transmission
not currently included in the model, such as the mid-May
turnout of dairy cattle from winter housing onto pasture.
The high degree of spatial correspondence between model
results and data depends on the inclusion of species and
herd-size heterogeneities in transmission (10). The model
captures the main regional foci of infection in Cumbria and
Devon, although there are some departures that may be
attributable to biases in the data (9) or local heterogeneities.
Rigorous statistical assessment of the spatial fit is compli-
cated by farm-level variation between simulations. The
numerical simulations from 23 February to August capture
the overall shape of the epidemic. Although this is not an
independent comparison (because the parameters are
estimated from the fit), the model’s ability to capture the
shape, spatial distribution, and variability of the epidemic is
encouraging [22].
Although employing empiricist repertoire these test results are
actually presented in very imprecise, contingent terms. Pinch et al
[16] observed discourse surrounding the testing of a very different
technology (clinical budgeting). Similar to their study, we observe
above that the results of the validity test are presented as a
qualitative interpretation of a figure (i.e., in the terms of Pinch et al
[16] evaluation of the results is based on weak programme
rhetoric). There is no attempt to delimit the conditions under
which this test could be falsified. Furthermore, again in agreement
with Pinch et al [16], we see that any ‘failure’ of the test (here
indicated by lack of agreement between predicted and observed
events) is ascribed to the particularities of the environment (such as
those that may be due to under-reporting of cases, turnout of
cattle, biases in the data or local heterogeneities) whereas areas of
agreement are assumed to be evidence of success.
Comparison of different models. The third method of
validation, comparison of model results with results of separate
models, is frequently used to support the validity of a model or of
its policy-related conclusion of the model (e.g. [26,32]).
E17 (Scientific paper)
Based on data collected during the epidemic, prospective
modelling using a variety of approaches gave the same
conclusions: (i) that the epidemic had not been brought under
control by ‘traditional’ methods, and (ii) that neighbourhood
control measures (the contiguous cull) could bring the
epidemic under control and result in a net saving of livestock.
Retrospective analyses suggest that the subsequent course of
the epidemic was consistent with a beneficial impact of the
contiguous cull and that it would have been difficult to achieve
a better outcome using reactive vaccination, which would
have required very large-scale vaccination programmes to
have been implemented quickly [32].
Here, the test used to confer validity to the models relies on
comparison of the model with regard to two quite general
conclusions. The first was that the epidemic was not under control,
and hence that ‘traditional’ methods had failed (and, presumably,
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that non-traditional approaches were now needed). The second
general conclusion was that culling needed to be extended to
include neighbouring farms, and that this would result, ultimately,
in fewer animals being killed. Again, the validation tests utilise
results expressed in weak program rhetoric, and without informa-
tion on whether agreement was also present for other relevant
model-generated conclusions. In fact, rather than seeking direct
validation of the models themselves, the primary function of the
above statement is validation of the conclusions of those models. The
statement does not require any consideration of the technical
qualities of the models or even why particular decisions were made
– the key point being tacitly negotiated is that the correct policy
action was taken. Hence, the form of validation above eliminates
issues of uncertainty in production and thus validity of the models
from the discourse.
Returning to more general consideration of this form of
validation, it is frequently stated that similarity of results provides,
at best, only weak evidence of model validity. This arises because
there may be tendency toward consensus due to similarity in, for
example, input data, parameter values, model construction and/or
the conceptualisation and contextualisation of the system. This
concern has been raised regarding UK 2001 FMD modelling
practices, which all shared ‘‘certain fundamental similarities’’ [36]
and were also noted in interviews with modellers.
E18 (Interview – modeller)
I mean, there’s people working on the … modelling now
who are all, kind of, competing institutions and individuals
at one level, but they’re all working together harmonisti-
cally…the trouble is that these – the groups don’t tend to
operate in that much isolation and there’s no rogue group.
E19 (Interview – modeller)
This is going back to the notion of, to what extent are the
models actually different from each other? But if, in many
respects, the models are actually the same as each other,
then the range of predictions they generate may not be wide
enough, ’cause they may all share the same inaccuracy.
Similar concerns were raised in the final report of Defra’s
Science Advisory Council [28], set up to investigate how Defra
uses modelling, and which encompassed and compared modelling
of infectious diseases, climate and air-pollution. Interestingly, in
this report this concern was raised only for climate models and not
explicitly extended to other modelling activities such as infectious
diseases. [28].
Finally, as noted by Haydon et al [36], all models used in the
UK 2001 FMD epidemic considered a narrow range of policy
options and ‘‘it is difficult to make the argument that mathematical
models showed that implementation of widespread and intensive
culling was the only tenable option.’’ Therefore, the strong
program rhetoric adopted in the comparison of models (and the
inferred validation of these and/or their conclusions) masks the
weak program test that is used, ignores issues that may bias the
models toward developing similar mutually affirming conclusions,
and limits the scope of discussion by disregarding alternative
potential policies.
Negotiation of uncertainty and the authority of
modelling
Many modellers we interviewed expressed awareness of
complex issues associated with communication of uncertainty to
decision-makers, with modellers being simultaneously aware of the
scientific basis of the models and the need to safeguard the
influence of modelling as a tool in decision-making.
E20 (Interview – modeller)
It’s very dangerous to say you don’t believe this model
before you start. It’s quite a hard trick to pull off to convince
the policymaker that the model has value and should be
believed and they should base their policy on it and at the
same time explain that actually the model, it’s not true, is
wrong.
E21 (Interview – modeller)
If the modellers believe a model’s giving important advice,
even though there’s a level of uncertainty in that advice, how
– it’s a real issue – how hard should you – if you feel the
advice is good advice and important, how hard should you
push it? ‘Cause if you’re – if you take a very open approach,
saying, ‘‘Well, this may or may not be correct, there are
different possibilities,’’ then you run the risk that what you
consider important advice may be ignored.
These modellers express the concern that exposure of their true
understanding of the uncertainties of a model would undermine its
credibility and prevent its effective contribution to decision-
making. This belief articulates two perceived distinctions between
the modellers and the model-users. The first is that modellers are
more aware of the uncertainties of the model than are model-
users. The second is that, despite a detailed appreciation of the
uncertainties in a model, modellers remain confident that the
model can inform policy, while in contrast, it is only through
(partial) ignorance that model-users can employ the findings of
models in decision-making.
This difference in knowledge about uncertainty accords with a
further key insight from social studies of science: MacKenzie’s
‘Certainty Trough’ [43]. In his book detailing the ways in which
missile accuracy is produced and understood, MacKenzie shows
that those closest to the production of knowledge (in our case the
model creators) are most aware of its uncertainties, whereas those
further distanced from model creation (model-users) may be less
aware, as they were not exposed to the complex contingencies of
production which, as we have shown, are essential to modelling.
The greater the distance from model construction therefore, the
more diminished are the chances of understanding the contingent
labours and knowledges known to specialists [44]. Hence, whilst
model-users may have some appreciation of general issues relating
to uncertainty in models, they may be poorly placed to judge the
depth or impact of these. This difficulty was articulated by one
respondent, quoting a colleague who had expressed frustration
with a model: ‘‘Everyone knew it was crap, but nobody knew
why’’. The model-users we interviewed expressed varying degrees
of sensitivity to uncertainty, and flexibility in their interpretation of
the importance of uncertainty. For example, for one respondent
the responsibility for model results to be useful rests with the
modellers.
E22 (Interview – model-user)
…Idon’t spend toomuch time thinking how uncertain are the
parameters of this model? So at that level the representation
that’s been made of the disease system I accept that, once it’s
got to me, some sort of scientists have done some verification
of it and it’s now believable and can be used as a reasonably
sensible representation of the way the next 1,000 years of
FMD outbreaks may turn out to be …
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However, reliance on modellers’ interpretation of uncertainty
may be problematic: modellers have a deep professional and
emotional investment in their work. As highlighted by Lahsen
[45], investigating the case of global climate change modelling,
knowledge producers are ‘‘certainly not critics’’ of their own
technology. The flexibility with which issues of uncertainty can be
represented by modellers, as already illustrated in this paper,
makes any characterisation of uncertainty partial and amenable to
selective presentation based on strategic choices [46]. Further-
more, Shackley and Wynne [46] contend that oscillation between
strong, empirical claims to scientific authority (models as
predictors) and more modest, contingent claims about models as
aids to understanding and discussion (models as ‘heuristics’) serves
to preserve certainty, and that modellers present and encourage
interpretations of models as ‘truth machines’ in discourse with
model-users (and other external audiences) in order to preserve the
authority of their models.
It is therefore interesting in our case, (in contrast to that of
MacKenzie) that some model-users expressed a desire to have a
more detailed appreciation of potential uncertainties. However,
this aspiration may be tempered by a lack of necessary technical
expertise to assess all implications of a model’s uncertainty. As
noted by one model-user, there was a desire for some level of
understanding of uncertainty:
E23 (Interview – model-user)
I want to understand some of it. Clearly, what I want to
know is the inputs in broad terms, so therefore what are the
datasets that are being used? Are you satisfied with the
quality of them? Have we got satis – are we satis – can we
get assurances about the quality, timeliness and accuracy of
the data? I want the modelling team to understand the
disease in the broadest sense of it. I don’t want people to
make assumptions about disease.
This extract exposes a limited wish list that would not be able to
expose all uncertainties. There is no sense of a formal consider-
ation of uncertainty, but rather only a need for assurances
regarding the input data and for the modellers to ‘‘understand the
disease in the broadest sense’’ and to not make assumptions. It is of
interest that the speaker begins by seeking to be satisfied with the
quality of the data, perhaps implying an active examination of
these data-sources by the model-users, but immediately hesitates
before settling for assurances of quality. Although not specified,
this appears to place the responsibility for quality-testing onto
another party, probably the modellers themselves. This respon-
dent also requires that the modellers do not make assumptions –
yet modellers themselves recognize that models are, by necessity,
simplifications of reality which require assumptions to be made.
Other model-users recognised that the impact of uncertainty on
decision-making was context dependent. For example, if a model
is to be used in support of pre-existent policy-decisions and the
model results are compatible with that decision, then the model
has little impact on the decision, it merely provides some
additional support for the decision-maker.
E24 (Interview – model-user)
If you need some information to make a decision, you want
to say that the evidence is backing your decision, you might
have already made a political decision or a decision based on
perhaps where you know the industry is happy to go and
you’re saying, ‘‘Oh, well, in order to tick this box that says,
yes, I’ve had evidence or I’ve commissioned some work that
says, yes, there’s evidence that supports our approach,’’ then
you’re less interested in perhaps what that uncertainty is.
Here the decision has been made and, provided the model
supports that decision, model results may be used almost
irrespective of issues of uncertainty because the model is actually
having little influence on the process of decision-making. However,
when a contrary situation was postulated (that is, a decision is
made that is contrary to the conclusions of a model) uncertainty
was usually not proposed as the cause of that decision, but rather
this was attributed to the role of other sources of knowledge.
E25 (Interview – model-user)
I think it’s more about perhaps, you know, perhaps if you’ve
been doing a piece of modelling work and it says that you
should do this, because a decision has been made not to do
that it’s not necessarily because the evidence has not been
listened to but the evidence is only part of that decision
making process.
Our general conclusion was that model-users felt ill placed to
judge a model on its technical merits and relied on interpretation
of model uncertainties by modellers themselves. This places
modellers in a strong negotiating position, which users typically
counter, if needed, by reference to external factors or sensitivities.
Furthermore, discussion of the role of modelling in decision-
making may be used more generally to modify interpretation of
the impact of uncertainty. For example, the role of a model in the
decision making process may be de-emphasized by highlighting
other factors important in this process and/or highlighting that the
model merely supported an existing decision. Such behaviours
were evident in our data, for example one modeller here referring
to models of the 2001 UK FMD epidemic:
E26 (Interview – modeller)
Yeah, so, my perception of it was that the modellers were
generally – and the models – were generally used to bolster
and reinforce the decisions that had already been made
about how to handle it, rather than directing anything new
or novel.
Hence, in this interpretation the model is, perhaps, a relatively
minor part of the information used to make or support a decision,
rather than the basis of that decision.
In contrast, critics of the role of models during the UK 2001
FMD epidemic [33,47]) emphasize the central role assumed by
models in the decision making process. For example, the very titles
of publications criticizing the role of modelling stress a central role
for modelling in decision-making; ‘‘‘Carnage by computer’: the
blackboard economics of the 2001 Foot and Mouth epidemic’’
[47] infers a direct link between the modelling activities
undertaken with computers and the large scale culling of livestock,
whilst ‘‘Destructive tension: mathematics versus experience – the
progress and control of the 2001 foot and mouth disease epidemic
in Great Britain’’ [33] suggests that modelling trumped more
experience-based perspectives in development of control policies.
By ascribing a definitive role for the models in decision-making,
combined with detailed exposition of possible uncertainties, critics
of the use of modelling construct a perspective in which models are
not able to act reliably in decision-making.
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Thus, whilst the notion of wrong but useful assumes that the quality
of a model can be ascertained in order to decide whether or not
the model should be ‘used’, in practice issues of model-quality may
be ignored, asymmetrically applied and superseded by additional
factors. We contend that rather than being based predominantly
on beliefs about quality, the usefulness and authority of a model
may at times be primarily based on its functional status within the
broad social and political environment in which it acts.
Conclusions
We have illustrated the flexibility with which issues of
uncertainty are managed in the discourse of infectious disease
modelling. We have highlighted the occurrence of both empiricist
and contingent repertoires [15] and different accounts of
uncertainty provided through these repertoires. We have also
found asymmetric accounting of evidence and uncertainties in
modelling and its uses, and contend that this may be a more
general form of the asymmetric accounting for error identified by
Gilbert and Mulkay [15].
Our analyses have also identified the use of strong and weak
program rhetoric [16] on the significance of uncertainties and the
truth-value of models, and, particularly, the way these may work
to support the role of modelling through testing. Finally, we have
found evidence to suggest that identification of uncertainties,
combined with their ‘deproblematisation’ can act to stabilise the
role of scientific modelling in decision-making, in the same way as
that identified by Singleton [17] for the role of laboratories in the
UK cervical screening programme.
We have also explored the role of negotiation of uncertainty in
the development of authority of models to inform decision-making.
We found that modellers, when communicating their results to
users, identified a tension between being open regarding issues of
uncertainty and the need to protect the authority of modelling by
minimizing the impact of that uncertainty. We also found that
awareness of and expression of certainty in our study were in
keeping with MacKenzie’s ‘Certainty Trough’ and that policy-
makers found issues of uncertainty, and its recognition, problem-
atic and employed different ways of managing this. We also found
that the need to assess the impact of uncertainty was dependent on
the role of the model in the decision making process.
Our analysis prompts three main conclusions: (i) discourse
around dynamical disease modelling has many similarities with
that found in other scientific and technological practices, (ii) the
flexible discourse of uncertainty in infectious disease modelling
renders uncertainty a plastic quality which is amenable to
‘interpretive flexibility’ and negotiation, and (iii) the utility of
models in the face of uncertainty is a function of this flexibility, the
negotiation this allows, and the contexts in which model outputs
are framed and interpreted in the decision making process.
Given these conclusions, application of the axiom wrong but useful
as a justification for the use of models in decision-making is highly
problematic, as neither the concept of ‘wrong’ nor of ‘useful’ have
fixed and definable meanings. At face value this may appear as
argument against any role for infectious disease dynamical
modelling in decision-making. However, this is not our aim.
Rather we agree with Stirling [48] and Leach and Scoones [49]
that domains in which ambiguity, uncertainty and ignorance are
key features, such as is the case for dynamical modelling of
emerging novel epidemics, are better addressed by plural,
conditional and nuanced advice, of which infectious disease
dynamical modelling may form a (modestly) useful part.
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